Is There a God?

IS THERE A GOD?

BY

CHARLES BRADLAUGH

From Charles Bradlaugh 's Theological Essays

London: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh
63, Fleet Street, London, E.C.-1887

IS THERE A GOD?

BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH

THE initial difficulty is in defining the word "God." It is equally
impossible to intelligently affirm or deny any proposition unless
there is at least an understanding, on the part of the affirmer or
denier, of the meaning of every word used in the proposition. To
me the word "God" standing alone is a word without meaning. I
find the word repeatedly used even by men of education and re-
finement, and who have won reputation in special directions of re-
search, rather to illustrate their ignorance than to explain their
knowledge. Various sects of Theists do affix arbitrary meanings to
the word "God," but often these meanings are in their terms self-
contradictory, and usually the definition maintained by one sect of
Theists more or less contradicts the definition put forward by
some other sect. With the Unitarian Jew, the Trinitarian Christian,
the old Polytheistic Greek, the modern Universalist, or the Cal-
vinist, the word "God" will in each case be intended to express a
proposition absolutely irreconcilable with those of the other sects.
In this brief essay, which can by no means be taken as a complete
answer to the question which forms its title, I will for the sake of
argument take the explanation of the word "God" as given with
great carefulness by Dr. Robert Flint, Professor of Divinity in the
University of Edinburgh, in two works directed by him against
Atheism. He defines God ("Antitheistic Theories," p. 1,) as "a
supreme, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient, righteous and be-
nevolent being who is distinct from and independent of what he
has created;" ("Theism," p. 1,) as "a self-existent, eternal being, in-
finite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and goodness,
the maker of heaven and earth;" and (p. 18,) "the creator and pre-
server of nature, the governor of nations, the heavenly father and
judge of man;" (p. 18,) "one infinite personal;" (p. 42,) "the one
infinite" being "who "is a person — is a free and loving intelli-
gence;" (p. 59,) "the creator, preserver, and ruler of all finite
beings;" (p. 65,) "not only the ultimate cause, but the supreme
intelligence;" and (p. 74,) "the supreme moral intelligence is an
unchangeable being." That is, in the above statements "God" is
defined by Professor Flint to be: A supreme, self-existent, the one
infinite, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, unchangeable, righteous,
and benevolent, personal being, creator and preserver of nature,
maker of heaven and earth; who is distinct from and independent
of what he has created, who is a free, loving, supreme, moral intel-
ligence, die governor of nations, the heavenly father and judge of
man.

The two volumes, published by William Blackwood and Son,
from which this definition has been collected, form the Baird

Lectures in favor of Theism for the years 1876 and 1877. Profes-
sor Flint has a well-deserved reputation as a clear thinker and writ-
er of excellent ability as a Theistic advocate. I trust, therefore, I
am not acting unfairly in criticising his definition. My first objec-
tion is, that to me the definition is on the face of it so self-contra-
dictory that a negative answer must be given to the question, Is
there such a God? The association of die word "supreme" with
the word "infinite" as descriptive of a "personal being" is utterly
confusing. "Supreme" can only be used as expressing comparison
between the being to whom it is applied, and some otiier being
with whom diat "supreme" being is assumed to have possible
points of comparison and is then compared. But "the one infinite
being" cannot be compared with any other infinite being, for the
wording of the definition excludes the possibility of any other
infinite being, nor could die infinite being — for die word "one"
may be dispensed with, as two infinite beings are unthinkable — be
compared with any finite being. "Supreme" is an adjective of re-
lation and is totally inapplicable to "the infinite." It can only be
applied to one of two or more unites. "Supreme" with "omni-
potent" is pleonastic. If it is said that the word "supreme" is now
properly used to distinguish between die Creator and the created,
the governor and that which is governed, dien it is clear that the
word "supreme" would have been an inapplicable word of de-
scription to "the one infinite being" prior to creation, and this
would involve the declaration that the exact description of the
unchangeable has been properly changed, which is an absurdity.
The definition affirms "creation," that is, affirms "God" existing
prior to such creation — i.e., then the sole existence; but the word
"supreme" could not dien apply. An existence cannot be de-
scribed as "highest" when there is none other; therefore, none less
high. The word "supreme" as a word of description is absolutely
contradictory of Monism. Yet Professor Flint himself says ("Anti-
Theistic Theories," p. 132), "that reason, when in quest of an ulti-
mate explanation of things, imperatively demands unity, and diat
only a Monistic theory of the universe can deserve the name of a
philosophy." Professor Flint has given no explanation of the
meaning he attaches to die word "self-existent." Nor, indeed, has
he given any explanation of any of his words of description. By
self-existent I mean that to which you cannot conceive antecedent.
By "infinite" I mean immeasurable, illimitable, indefinable; i.e.,
that of which I cannot predicate extension, or limitation of exten-
sion. By "eternal" I mean illimitable, indefinable, i.e., diat of
which I cannot predicate limitation of duration or progression of
duration.

"Nature" is with me die same as "universe," the same as "exist-
ence;" i.e., I mean by it: The totality of all phenomena, and of all
diat has been, is, or may be necessary for die happening of each

and every phenomenon. It is from the very terms of the definition,
self-existent, eternal, infinite. I cannot think of nature commence-
ment, discontinuity, or creation. I am unable to think backward to
the possibility of existence not having been. I cannot think forward
to the possibility of existence ceasing to be. I have no meaning for
die word "create" except to denote change of condition. Origin of
"universe" is to me absolutely unthinkable. Sir William Hamilton
("Lectures and Discussions," p. 610) affirms: that when aware of a
new appearance we are utterly unable to conceive that there has
originated any new existence; that we are utterly unable to diink
that die complement of existence has ever been either increased
or diminished; that we can neither conceive nothing becoming
something, or something becoming nothing. Professor Flint's defi-
nition affirms "God" as existing "distinct from, and independent
of, what he has created." But what can such words mean when
used of the "infinite?" Does "distinct from" mean separate from?
Does the "universe" existing distinct from God mean in addition
to? and in other place than? or, have die words no meaning?

Of all words in Professor Flint's definition, which would be ap-
propriate if used of human beings, I mean the same as I should
mean if I used die same words in the highest possible degree of
any human being. Here I maintain die position taken by John
Stuart Mill in his examination of Sir W. Hamilton (p. 1 22) . Right-
eousness and benevolence are two of the words of description
included in the definition of this creator and governor of nations.
But is it righteous and benevolent to create men and govern na-
tions so diat the men act criminally and die nations seek to destroy
one anodier in war? Professor Flint does not deny ("Theism," p.
256) "that God could have originated a sinless moral system," and
he adds: "I have no doubt diat God has actually made many moral
beings who are certain never to oppose dieir own wills to his, or
that he might, if he had so pleased, have created only such angels
as were sure to keep dieir first estate." But it is inaccurate to de-
scribe a "God" as righteous or benevolent who, having the com-
plete power to originate a sinless moral system, is admitted to have
originated a system in which sinfulness and immorality were not
only left possible, but have actually, in consequence of God's rule
and government, become abundant. It cannot be righteous for die
"omnipotent" to be making human beings contrived and designed
by his omniscience so as to be fitted for the commission of sin. It
cannot be benevolent in "God" to contrive and create a hell in
which he is to torment die human beings who have sinned be-
cause made by him in sin. "God," if omnipotent and omniscient,
could just as easily, and much more benevolendy, have contrived
diat there should never be any sinners, and, therefore, never any
need for hell or torment.

The Rev. R.A. Armstrong, with whom I dehated this question,
says: —

"'Either,' argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, 'God could make a
world without suffering, or he could not. If he could and did not,
he is not all-good. If he could not, he is not all-powerful.' The
reply is, What do you mean by all-powerful? If you mean having
power to reconcile things in themselves contradictory, we do not
hold that God is all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first enjoy-
ing immunity from suffering, and yet possessed of nobility of char-
acter, is a self-contradictory conception."

That is, Mr. Armstrong thinks that a "sinless moral system
from the first is a self-contradictory conception."

It is difficult to think a loving governor of nations arranging
one set of cannibals to eat, and another set of human beings to be
eaten by their fellow-men. It is impossible to think a loving creator
and governor contriving a human being to be born into the world
the pre-natal victim of transmitted disease. It is repugnant to rea-
son to affirm this "free loving supreme moral intelligence" plan-
ning and contriving the enduring through centuries of criminal
classes, plague-spots on civilisation.

The word "unchangeable" contradicts the word "creator." Any
theory of creation must imply some period when the being was
not yet the creator, that is, when yet the creation was not per-
formed, and die act of creation must in such case, at any rate, in-
volve temporary or permanent change in the mode of existence of
the being creating. So, too, the words of description "governor of
nations" are irreconcileable with the description "unchangeable,"
applied to a being alleged to have existed prior to the creation of
the "nations," and therefore, of course, long before any act of
government could be exercised.

To speak of an infinite personal being seems to me pure con-
tradiction of terms. All attempts to think "person" involve
thoughts of the limited, finite, conditioned. To describe this infi-
nite personal being as distinct from some tiling which is pos-
tulated as "what he has created" is only to emphasise the con-
tradiction, rendered perhaps still more marked when the infinite
personal being is described as "intelligent."

The Rev. R.A. Armstrong, in a prefatory note to the report of
his debate with myself on the question "Is it reasonable to worship
God?" says: "I have ventured upon alleging an intelligent cause of
the phenomena of the universe, in spite of the fact that in several
of his writings Mr. Bradlaugh has described intelligence as im-
plying limitations. But though intelligence, as known to us in man,
is always hedged within limits, there is no difficulty in conceiving
each and every limit as removed. In that case die essential con-
ception of intelligence remains die same precisely, although the
change of conditions revolutionises its mode of working." This, it

seems to me, is not accurate. The word intelligence can only be
accurately used of man, as in each case meaning the totality of
mental ability, its activity and result. If you eliminate in each case
all possibilities of mental ability there is no "conception of intel-
ligence" left, either essential or otherwise. If you attempt to re-
move the limits, that is the organisation, the intelligence ceases to
be thinkable. It is unjustifiable to talk of "change of conditions"
when you remove the word intelligence as a word of application to
man or other thinking animal, and seek to apply the word to the
unconditional.

As an Atheist I affirm one existence, and deny the possibility
of more than one existence; by existence meaning, as I have al-
ready stated, "the totality of all phenomena, and of all that has
been, is, or may be necessary for the happening of any and every
phenomenon." This existence I know in its modes, each mode
being distinguished in thought by its qualities. By "mode" I mean
each cognised condition; that is, each phenomenon or aggregation
of phenomena. By "quality" I mean each characteristic by which
in the act of thinking I distinguish.

The distinction between the Agnostic and the Atheist is that
either the Agnostic postulates an unknowable, or makes a blank
avowal of general ignorance. The Atheist does not do either; there
is of course to him much that is yet unknown, every effort of in-
quiry brings some of this within reach of knowing. With "the un-
knowable" conceded, all scientific teaching would be illusive.
Every real scientist teaches without reference to "God" or "the
unknowable." If the words come in as part of the yesterday habit
still clinging to-day, the scientist conducts his experiments as
though the words were not. Every operation of life, of commerce,
of war, of statesmanship, is dealt with as though God were non-
existent. The general who asks God to give him victory, and who
thanks God for the conquest, would be regarded as a lunatic by
his Theistic brethren, if he placed the smallest reliance on God's
omnipotence as a factor in winning the fight. Cannon, gunpowder,
shot, shell, dynamite, provision, men, horses, means of transport,
the value of these all estimated, then the help of "God" is added to
what is enough without God to secure the triumph. The surgeon
who in performing some delicate operation relied on God instead
of his instruments — the physician who counted on the unknow-
able in his prescription — these would have poor clientele even
amongst the orthodox; save the peculiar people the most pious
would avoid their surgical or medical aid. The "God" of the
Theist, the "unknowable" of the Agnostic, are equally opposed to
the Atheistic affirmation. The Atheist enquires as to the unknown,
affirms the true, denies the untrue. The Agnostic knows not of any
proposition whether it be true or false.

Pantheists affirm one existence, but Pantheists declare that at
any rate some qualities are infinite, e.g., that existence is infinitely
intelligent. I, as an Atheist, can only think qualities of phenomena.
I know each phenomenon by its qualities. I know no qualities ex-
cept as the qualities of some phenomenon.

So long as the word "God" is undefined I do not deny "God."
To the question, Is there such a God as defined by Professor
Flint, I am compelled to give a negative reply. If the word "God" is
intended to affirm Dualism, then as a Monist I negate "God."

The attempts to prove the existence of God may be divided
into three classes: — 1. Those which attempt to prove the objective
existence of God from the subjective notion of necessary existence
in the human mind, or from the assumed objectivity of space and
time, interpreted as the attributes of a necessary substance. 2.
Those which "essay to prove the existence of a supreme self-
existent cause, from the mere fact of the existence of the world by
the application of the principle of causality, starting with the pos-
tulate of any single existence whatsoever, the world, or anything in
the world, and proceeding to argue backwards or upwards, the ex-
istence of one supreme cause is held to be regressive inference
from the existence of these effects." But it is enough to answer to
these attempts, that if a supreme existence were so demonstrable,
that bare entity would not be identifiable with "God." "A de-
monstration of a primitive source of existence is of no formal
theological value. It is an absolute zero."

3. The argument from design, or adaptation, in nature, the
fitness of means to an end, implying, it is said, an architect or
designer. Or, from the order in the universe, indicating, it is said,
an orderer or lawgiver, whose intelligence we thus discern.

But this argument is a failure, because from finite instances dif-
fering in character it assumes an infinite cause absolutely the same
for all. Divine unity, divine personality, are here utterly unproved.
"Why should we rest in our inductive inference of one designer
from the alleged phenomena of design, when these are claimed to
be so varied and so complex?"

If the inference from design is to avail at all, it must avail to
show that all the phenomena leading to misery and mischief, must
have been designed and intended by a being finding pleasure in
the production and maintenance of this misery and mischief. If
the alleged constructor of the universe is supposed to have de-
signed one beneficent result, must he not equally be supposed to
have designed all results? And if the inference of benevolence and
goodness be valid for some instances, must not the inference of
malevolence and wickedness be equally valid from others? If, too,
any inference is to be drawn from the illustration of organs in
animals supposed to be specially contrived for certain results, what
is the inference to be drawn from the many abortive and in-

complete organs, muscles, nerves, etc., now known to be traceable
in man and other animals? What inference is to be drawn from
each instance of deformity or malformation? But die argument
from design, if it proved anything, would at die most only prove an
arranger of pre-existing material; it in no sense leads to the
conception of an originator of substance.

There is no sort of analog}' between a finite artificer arranging
a finite mechanism and an alleged divine creator originating all ex-
istence. From an alleged product you are only at liberty to infer a
producer after having seen a similar product actually produced.

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London: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh
63, Fleet Street, London, E.C-1887